Digital Threat Digest - Season of Migration to the North
The title of this digest is bittersweet. It’s a famous Sudanese novel by Tayeb Saleh set in the 1960s, a significant and tumultuous time in Sudan’s history; a newly independent country dealing with conflict in its postcolonial state. The story reflects conflict in Sudan and the degree to which Sudanese identity has been shaped by British colonialism, following the life of a man who returns to home after an education in the UK and is struggling to find his way.
Over the last twelve days, Sudan again finds itself in conflict. And while it may seem that Sudan is synonymous with conflict and war, it has never been like this. On 15 April 2023, armed conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) broke out. However, this is not a civil war. It is not a coup d’état. It is a war between the egos of two men – leader of the RSF, Hemetti and leader of the SAF Burhan, who have put Sudan’s citizens in the middle of their personal conflict with seemingly little regard for civilian casualties.
Initial news reports framed this as a civil war, but that gives a certain sense of agency to citizens, when in fact they’ve had no agency at all; forced to flee their homes, mourn loved ones, and most importantly, lose their country. During the revolution that started in late 2018, the civilians’ motto was silmiya, which translates to peace in Arabic. They wanted to protest in peace and saw violence as the antithesis to the Sudan they wanted to create – the opposite of what is occurring today.
This conflict is different in many ways to previous modern conflicts in Sudan, including the revolution. Leaders have resorted to limiting internet accessibility, initiating several internet blocks to stop attempts at civilian mobilisation and awareness raising. We have spoken about the power of digitally authoritarian governments and how internet rationing remains a key tool in limiting unrest. Today, Hemetti and Burhan are at the centre of the internet – using social media as a propaganda tool to further their interests.
Hemetti and the RSF’s use of social media is not new. Hemetti is known to have hired several PR firms and media agencies outside Sudan to build an image for a man many believe came out of nowhere. Today he uses his personal social media accounts to share updates on the RSF’s activity – switching to English to appeal to the West as he suggests the RSF is protecting its civilians and waging a war against ‘Islamic radicals’ and ‘extremists’ – using buzzwords likely to attract Western support. On Twitter, several inorganic attempts to bolster the RSF through networks of bot-like accounts with identical messaging to suggest that Hemetti ‘is a man of peace’, that this is a war against extremists and that Hemetti is just protecting the country can be found. The RSF’s presence on Twitter has also been complicated by an account impersonating the RSF – buying its Twitter Blue verification and releasing statements that Hemetti was killed, another example of how Elon Musk’s policies has made information environments more complex.
There have also been several forms of misattributed videos and images as well as repurposed videos showcasing the RSF’s ‘victories’, only to then be identified as footage from the RSF in Libya over the last few years. This has also been done by the SAF who are only just beginning to create their online footprint. The SAF’s social media accounts have suddenly become active sharing videos of their ‘victories’, showing their fighters giving food and aid to children over Eid to counter the images and stories of those who have seen no compassion or support from the SAF. SAF and RSF supporters will likely continue to use their online personas to amplify each side – since 2019 there have been rumours that Hemetti pays supporters to share pro-Hemetti content online, and this will be no different.
This only begins to scratch the surface. Sudan’s strategic position in Africa sets the precedent for foreign interest and interference online which will likely only further the RSF and the SAF’s online activity and ability.
The reality is that today many Sudanese people have become refugees, like the main character from Season of Migration to the North. Sudanese people are lost, trying to find their way out and while a war is happening on the ground, it is also happening online – furthering the interests of two men while a country and its people continue to crumble.
PGI’s Digital Investigations Team brings you the Digital Threat Digest, SOCMINT and OSINT insights into disinformation, influence operations, and online harms.
More about Protection Group International's Digital Investigations
PGI’s Digital Investigations Analysts combine modern exploitative technology with deep human analytical expertise that covers the social media platforms themselves and the behaviours and the intents of those who use them. Our experienced analyst team have a deep understanding of how various threat groups use social media and follow a three-pronged approach focused on content, behaviour and infrastructure to assess and substantiate threat landscapes.
Disclaimer: Protection Group International does not endorse any of the linked content.